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Abstract
We examine the distribution of hours of work across industrial sec-
tors in OECD countries. We find large disparities when sectors are
divided into three groups: one that produces goods without home
substitutes, and two others that have home substitutes — health and
social work, and all others. We attribute the disparities to the coun-
tries’ tax and subsidy policies. High taxation substantially reduces
hours in sectors that have close home substitutes but less so in other
sectors. Health and social care subsidies increase hours in that sector.
We compute these eﬀects for nineteen OECD countries.
Keywords. hours of work, employment shares, home production,
childcare, tax wedge, welfare state, social subsidies
JEL classifications. E02, H53, I18, I38, J22
There are large diﬀerences in the kind of jobs that people do across the
industrial countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD). To illustrate the point, we report in Table 1 the percentage
distribution of hours of work in three countries with diﬀerent social support
Table 1:
Percentage Distribution of Hours of Market Work in Three Countries
(average, 1994-2003)
Sector United States Japan Sweden
1 63 62 63
2 10 6 17
3 27 31 21
The full definition of sectors is given in Table 3. Sector 1 is mainly manufacturing and
business services, sector 2 is health and social work and sector 3 is mainly unskilled or
semi-skilled services. Government administration and education are excluded.
programs, the United States, Japan and Sweden.1 Hours of work are sorted
into three groups, according to whether or not the output of an industry has
close substitutes in home production. Sector 1 comprises agriculture, manu-
facturing, business services and other services of a specialized nature, which
are activities that have no counterpart in home production, as reported in
time use surveys. Sector 2 is the health and social work sector, which has
home counterparts, especially in childcare. Sector 3 consists of all other
sectors, which produce less specialized services and which also have close
substitutes in home production, such as retailing (a substitute for shopping
time) and catering (a substitute for cooking time).
The share of sector 1 is very similar across the three countries, taking
up about 63% of market work (the figures are rounded). In contrast, there
are large diﬀerences in the shares of the other two sectors. Sweden has a
relatively larger health and social work sector, whereas Japan has the largest
share in sector 3, exceeding the Swedish share of this sector by ten percentage
points. Why these large diﬀerences in the distribution of work?
One possible cause of these diﬀerences is related to past productivity
growth in diﬀerent sectors of the economy. In our earlier work (Ngai and
Pissarides, 2007, 2008) we showed in a dynamic model that if final outputs
are poor consumption substitutes for each other, employment shares grow
faster in sectors characterized by lower rate of productivity growth. So,
if historically Swedish productivity growth in health and social work was
much below productivity growth in the United States and Japan, there could
be a productivity explanation for the large share of this sector in Sweden.
1Our aggregate is economy-wide hours of work excluding public administration, defense
and education. A discussion of the data for all the countries, including social support
programs and their diﬀerences, is contained in the main body of the paper. For more
information on social programs see Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999).
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Similarly for unskilled services in Japan.
But this cannot be the main explanation for the type of cross-country
diﬀerences shown in Table 1. The cross-country diﬀerences shown are in
shares, i.e., in the ratio of hours in one sector to the sum of hours in the
other sectors. Such diﬀerences need to be explained by diﬀerences in relative
productivity levels. So if productivity is to explain the larger health and
social work sector in Sweden, the ratio of productivity in health and social
work to the rest of the private economy in Sweden needs to be much smaller
than the same ratio in Japan or the United States. Moreover, if productivity
were the reason for the diﬀerences in time allocations, the substitutions would
not be exclusively between sectors 2 and 3 but they would aﬀect sector 1 as
well. We compute the diﬀerences in productivity ratios required to explain
the diﬀerent allocations shown in Table 1 for all countries in our sample, and
conclude that they are implausible. Moreover we find no compelling reasons
for bigger deviations in technology between sectors 2 and 3 than between
either of these sectors and sector 1.2
We argue that the key reason for the large diﬀerences in the cross-country
allocation of hours is policy, and the home-market substitution. In Sweden
taxes on market economic activity are much higher than they are in either the
United States or Japan, but a large part of the revenue is used to subsidize
the provision of social care. Consumption demand shifts from the output of
the taxed sectors to the subsidized social care sector and the untaxed home
production. We document the policy diﬀerences across 19 OECD countries
and quantify their impact on the sectoral allocation of work. The data re-
quirements for this work are large and they are the main limiting factor in
our choice of countries and time period.
Taxes have distortionary eﬀects on the sectoral allocation of market work
for two reasons. First, not all types of work are equally taxed. We find
that all countries subsidize health and social work, but Sweden and other
Scandinavian countries subsidize them much more than other countries do.
The tax diﬀerentials between social work on the one hand, and all other
economic activity on the other, vary a lot across countries, and this explains
some of the sectoral diﬀerences across countries.
We find, however, that quantitatively the policy impact on the cross-
market substitutions is not big enough to explain the large diﬀerences in
2Another possible cause of the observed diﬀerences in the distribution of work are
diﬀerences in tastes. We do not model the origin of tastes, so we cannot properly evaluate
such an explanation. But we still find this explanation implausible because the “relative”
diﬀerences in tastes required to explain the data are very large. For example, one would
need to find reasons that explain why Swedes like market-produced health and social work
relative to market-produced food much more than Americans and Japanese do.
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reallocations of the kind shown in Table 1. For example, when an accoun-
tant’s services are taxed and a childminder’s services subsidized, a family
may hire an accountant for fewer hours and take the child to a childcare
center, but the elasticity of substitution between the services of an accoun-
tant and the services of a childminder is not large enough to support the
required quantitative impact. Moreover, since there are no tax distortions
between sectors 1 and 3, the asymmetries shown in Table 1 require a much
higher elasticity of substitution between the outputs of sectors 2 and 3 than
between the outputs of sectors 1 and 2. This does not seem plausible and
there is no empirical evidence supporting it.
In order to explain the big impact of tax-subsidy programs and the large
diﬀerences across sectors, we need the second reason for the distortionary
eﬀects of taxation, which works even when taxation is uniform across the
economy: the substitution between market and home production. When
market goods and services are taxed, households turn to producing some of
those goods in the home, where work is untaxed. Similarly, when market-
provided social care is subsidized, less of it is done at home and there is more
take-up of social services in the market. Because the elasticity of substitu-
tion is high between market goods and home production, taxation has a big
quantitative impact; and because this elasticity is not the same across all
goods, the impact is not uniform across all sectors of market activity. The
diﬀerential substitutions between market and home production, when com-
bined with the diﬀerential tax treatment of social work, drive our results.
We find support for this claim in our quantitative evaluation of the impact
of policy in 19 OECD countries.
We are not the first ones to study the impact of market-home substitu-
tions on market economic activity, although we believe that we are the first
ones to derive the distribution of market work across sectors in an equilib-
rium model. Freeman and Schettkat (2005) study micro time use data for
a small number of countries and conclude that there is virtually one-for-one
substitution between home and market work across individuals, a claim that
was partially supported by Burda, Hamermesh and Weill (2008). We focus
on the impact of the market-home substitutions conditional on total market
work, and our results require market-home substitutions at the micro level,
although not necessarily one-for-one.
Kelly Ragan (2006) looks at policy eﬀects on the choice between home
and market work, and makes use of time use surveys, so in this respect her
study is close to ours. But unlike us, she studies total hours of work in a
small sample of countries, using a variant of the model of Rosen (1997), one
of the pioneers in this area of research. Total hours of work (in Sweden and
how they compare with the United States) is also the focus of studies by
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Rogerson (2007) and Olovsson (2009).3 Davis and Henrekson (2005) study
questions similar to ours in a partial equilibrium task-assignment model, and
estimate the impact of taxation on employment in three sectors of economic
activity, eating and drinking establishments, lodging and retail trade.4 Their
estimation results are consistent with the results of our model.
Finally, Rogerson (2008), in a study that takes an approach similar to
ours, shows that the gap in total hours of work between the United States
and an aggregate of five continental European countries is due to diﬀerences
in the size of the service sector. He argues that marketization is a key reason
behind these diﬀerences. But although his argument is similar to ours, his
focus is the dynamic evolution of total hours of work in services since 1950.
In this paper we do not aggregate all service activities together, because
some are treated diﬀerently by tax-subsidy programs and some do not have
home-production substitutes. We construct tax-subsidy rates for each and
every one of our nineteen countries, distinguish between three types of service
activities and look at the distribution of hours across these activities.
Our model has the smallest number of sectors needed to capture the
distortionary impact of uniform taxation and targeted subsidies. As in the
example of Table 1, we distinguish between three market sectors. One that
includes all sectors that produce output that has no close home substitutes;
one with health and social work that has close home substitutes and is sub-
sidized;5 and one that includes all other sectors that have close home substi-
tutes and are not subsidized (a full listing of two-digit sectors is given later
in this paper, in Table 3). Corresponding to the three market sectors, and
given the assumptions that we are making, there are two types of home-
produced goods, which we also call sectors for easier reference. One home
sector produces goods that are close substitutes to health and social work
(mostly childcare) and the other produces goods that are close substitutes
to all other services.6
3For more detailed discussion of the Swedish welfare state and its role in the economy,
see Lindbeck (1997).
4They deliberately omit childcare because of diﬃculties in constructing comparable
subsidy rates across the countries in their sample, one of the challenges that we take up
in this paper. Their sample of countries for the employment regressions varies between 9
and 14 countries, depending on data availability.
5Unfortunately, it is not possible to distinguish between high-skill health care, e.g.,
hospital treatment, and social work, such as childcare centers or elderly care. Ideally, our
sector 2 should exclude high-skill health care which has no home substitutes.
6In Ngai and Pissarides (2008) we discuss in detail the kind of activities spent in home
production and review their historical development. The sector allocations that we are
adopting here are consisetent with that evidence. See also Robinson and Godbey (1997)
for the US and Burda, Hamermesh and Weil (2008) for cross-country comparisons.
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Our model has simple linear production functions with no capital, which
we believe is a useful restriction for the points that we want to make. The
key to the model are two elasticities of substitution, the one between market
goods and the one between market and home production. We show that
general taxation has a greater impact on sector 3 than on sector 1, because
sector 3 loses more hours to the untaxed home sector. But sector 2 is sub-
sidized, so market hours gain both from the home sector (if the subsidy is
large enough to outweigh the impact of the income tax) and from the other
two non-subsidized sectors.
In order to quantify our predictions we need three diﬀerent types of data.7
First, we need to know the hours of work allocated to diﬀerent sectors, which
are available for a fairly large number of countries at the two-digit level
through the database Productivity in the European Union: A Comparative
Industry Approach (EU KLEMS). Second, we need the size of social expen-
diture on benefits in kind, such as day care centers, which can be obtained
from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). Finally, we need to
know the hours allocated to diﬀerent activities at home, which we obtain from
time use surveys. We constructed comparable data sets for 19 OECD coun-
tries and we focus on cross-country diﬀerences around the time of the time
use surveys, circa 2000. These countries include several European countries
from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean, the United States, Canada, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Japan and Korea, so we have a good mix of welfare
states and policy regimes.
Section 1 describes our model of three market and two home sectors.
We derive equilibrium allocations as functions of three sets of parameters,
preferences, technology and policy. In section 2 we describe the relevant
data for the 19 countries in our sample and summarize their main features.
In section 3 we give the parameter values used in the quantitative evaluation
of the impact of policy. The quantitative evaluation begins with section 4,
where we illustrate the workings of the model within the policy parameter
range calculated in the data section, and refer back to the example of Table
1. Predictions with the full sample are given in sections 5, 6 and 7, beginning
with cross-market substitutions and following up with substitutions between
market and home production.
1 The model
Consumer allocations. We solve the time allocations for a representative
agent who has a static CES utility function defined over consumption goods
7See the Appendix for a full listing of data sources and definitions.
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produced at home and in the market, and over leisure. She is a price and
wage taker in the market, conditional on taxes and transfers chosen by the
government, and chooses home production conditional on linear production
functions. There is no capital in the model so it can be solved as a static re-
source allocation problem, with linear production functions for market goods
as well and market clearing throughout. There are no profits in equilibrium
and all income is in the form of wages. The government balances its budget
with lump-sum transfers.
The representative agent’s utility function is
U (c, lm, lh) = ln c+ v(1− lm − lh), (1)
where c is a consumption aggregate, lm is market work (private and govern-
ment), and lh is home work. v(.) is an increasing concave function. Aggregate
consumption is a CES aggregate of three types of goods, denoted by c˜i,
c =
∙
3P
i=1
ωic˜
(ε−1)/ε
i
¸ε/(ε−1)
, (2)
where ε ≥ 0 is the constant elasticity of substitution and ωi > 0, Σωi = 1.
Each c˜i is a composite of market-produced and home-produced goods in
sector i. Sector 1 is comprised of all goods that have no home-produced
substitutes, so c˜1 is the market good c1. In sectors 2 and 3, c˜i is a CES
aggregate of market and home produced goods,
c˜i =
h
ψic
(σi−1)/σi
i + (1− ψi)c
(σi−1)/σi
ih
iσi/(σi−1)
i = 2, 3, (3)
where ci is market-produced consumption, cih is consumption of goods pro-
duced at home, σi ≥ 0 is the elasticity of substitution between home and
market consumption for each good i and ψi ∈ (0, 1).
Government taxes wage income at rate τ , and each market good at a
net rate ti (the gross tax rate less any subsidy). It also taxes or subsidizes
employment, at a rate te. It uses its net revenue from the taxes and subsi-
dies to employ labor and supply goods to consumers. We assume that the
product of public administration is a public good that is separable from the
goods included in the aggregate c.We also exclude from c education services,
because they are not a final consumption good but an investment good. The
employment used to produce the public good and education is part of lm.
We do include in c health and social care. This is because our focus is on
social care, which is clearly a consumption good that can be produced both
at home and in the market. The amount of health services consumed by the
representative agent is also a matter of consumption decisions, depending on
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the cost to the individual. Health and social care are subsidized by the gov-
ernment, either directly through the provision of subsidized care or through
transfers. We treat the subsidy as a negative tax, with the individual having
free choice over the quantity that she consumes at the subsidized price.
Governments also make lump-sum transfers T to the representative agent,
which are a component of their social policy and include an item for balanc-
ing the budget. The assumptions made about the substitution possibilities
between government-supplied goods and goods bought privately influence the
size of the implicit lump-sum transfer from the government to the represen-
tative agent. The lump-sum transfer plays a critical role in studies of the
impact of taxation on total hours of work, such as that of Prescott (2004)
and its oﬀshoots. It plays no role in our study of the percentage distribution
of work, so we do not need to be explicit about its magnitude.
The disutility from work is independent of sector or location and there
is perfect labor mobility. The wage rate is the same in all sectors, so the
budget constraint on the consumption of market goods is,
3P
i=1
(1 + ti)pici ≤ (1− τ)wlm + T. (4)
The consumption of home goods is constrained by the linear production
functions,
cjh ≤ Ajhljh, j = 2, 3, (5)
where ljh is the time allocated at home to each activity j and Ajh is labor
productivity in each activity.
In order to solve the problem it is convenient to define a new budget con-
straint for total work l ≡ lm+lh, that incorporates the production constraints
(5). Define “total” after-tax income by (1− τ)wl, and re-write (4) as
3P
i=1
(1 + ti)pici ≤ (1− τ)wl − (1− τ)w(l2h + l3h) + T. (6)
Next, substitute ljh from (5) into (6), to obtain,
3P
i=1
(1 + ti)pici +
3P
j=2
pjhcjh ≤ (1− τ)wl + T, (7)
where pjh ≡ (1−τ)w/Ajh is a net implicit (producer) price for home-produced
goods. The numerator is the net wage that the household could get by
supplying one unit of labor to the market, and the denominator is the number
of units of the home good that she could get by supplying the same unit to
home production.
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The consumer problem is the maximization of (1)-(3) subject to the single
constraint (7). From the optimality conditions we derive some key results,
focusing our discussion only on the results that have a direct bearing on the
distribution of market work.
Market shares. We make predictions about the distribution of mar-
ket work by computing the market share of each sector, defined by sj =
100lj/Σ3i=1li. Given the structure of the model, it is convenient to derive
these predictions from the model’s predictions of the ratios l2/l1 and l3/l1,
by re-writing the shares as:
sj = 100
lj/l1
Σ3i=1li/l1
j = 1, 2, 3 (8)
To make these predictions we therefore need to derive expressions for just
two ratios of hours of work, l2/l1 and l3/l1. We do this in three steps.
Marketization. The composite good c˜j can be acquired by buying some
cj from the market at price (1 + tj)pj, or by producing it at home as cjh at
a (shadow) unit cost pjh. We define “marketization” as the substitution of
one unit of cj for cjh. The extent of marketization is obtained by setting the
marginal rate of substitution across goods cj and cjh equal to their relative
prices:
cjh
cj
=
µ
ψj
1− ψj
pjh
(1 + tj) pj
¶σj
j = 2, 3. (9)
Recalling that pjh = (1− τ)w/Ajh, it follows that consumers marketize more
of good j if they have higher net wages, if the market good is cheaper or if
labor productivity in home production is lower. The impact of these para-
meters depends on the elasticity of substitution between market and home
goods. In the limit, as σj → 0, the two types of goods are consumed in
fixed proportions. But for σj > 0 there can be a lot of diﬀerences in the
marketization of home production across individuals, countries or over time,
depending on the values taken by taxes and market prices.
Relative demand for market goods. We next solve for the ratio of real
demand for market goods 2 and 3, which have home substitutes, to the
demand for good 1. The objective is to obtain from these ratios the employ-
ment shares in each sector of market activity. Setting the marginal rate of
substitution across good j and good 1 equal to their relative price, we obtain,
cj
c1
=
µ
ωjψj
ω1
¶εµ
(1 + tj)pj
(1 + t1)p1
¶−εµcj
c˜j
¶1−ε/σj
, (10)
We note that cj/c˜j is the share of good j that is marketized. It follows that
the relative market demand for good j is a decreasing function of its relative
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consumer price and, under the plausible restriction ε ≤ σj, an increasing
function of the degree of its marketization. Marketization is an important
channel through which policy influences relative market shares. Higher and
uniform taxes on all goods (i.e., tj = t1) do not aﬀect relative consumption
shares for given marketization, but they imply less marketization for good
j and so a lower market share for this good, relative to the market share of
good 1.
The sectoral allocation of time. In order to derive the market employment
shares we make use of market clearing and the production functions for each
market good. Let the production functions be
ci ≤ Aili, i = 1, 2, 3. (11)
The notation parallels that for home production, with Ai standing for the
(market) labor productivity of good i and li for the number of hours allocated
to it.
The net revenue to the firm from the sale of good i is piAili, and is used
to pay for wages and employment taxes net of subsidies. Free mobility of
labor implies that wages are the same in all market sectors, so if employment
taxes are also the same across sectors, relative producer prices are given by
the ratio of the technology parameters:
(1 + te)wli = piAili =⇒
pi
pj
=
Aj
Ai
, i, j = 1, 2, 3. (12)
The relative price of the market good to the implicit price of the home
good is also obtained from (12), by substituting w from it into the condition
pjh = (1− τ)w/Ajh. This substitution yields,
(1 + tj)pj
pjh
=
(1 + tj)(1 + te)Ajh
(1− τ)Aj
. (13)
We define the “tax wedge” that applies to sector j, denoted twj, by8
twj = 1−
1− τ
(1 + tj)(1 + te)
. (14)
The relative price of the market good to the implicit price of the home good
in sectors 2 and 3 becomes,
(1 + tj)pj
pjh
=
Ajh
(1− twj)Aj
j = 2, 3. (15)
8For small tax rates this is approximately equal to the tax wedge used in econometric
studies, twj = τ + tj + te, but taxes in our sample of countries are not small and the
approximation is not good.
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Given now the linear production functions, the marketization condition
(9) translates into the following condition for the marketization of time in
sector j :
lj
ljh
=
µ
1
ψj
− 1
¶−σj µ Aj
Ajh
¶σj−1
(1− twj)σj j = 2, 3. (16)
The marketization of time is driven by three sets of parameters, preferences,
productivity, and taxes. For σj > 1,more is marketized when market produc-
tivity is higher than home productivity.9 More importantly for our present
objectives, the impact of policy is summarized in a single composite, the tax
wedge. Higher tax wedge leads to less marketization and the impact is bigger
when the elasticity σj is bigger.
Turning now to market sectors, we derive the employment ratios of sectors
from (10) and the linear production functions:
lj
l1
=
µ
ωjψj
ω1
¶εµA1
Aj
¶1−εµ
1 + tj
1 + t1
¶−εµcj
c˜j
¶1−ε/σj
. (17)
Calculating cj/c˜j from (3), (9) and (15), we obtain
cj
c˜j
= ψ−σj/(σj−1)j
"
1 +
µ
1
ψj
− 1
¶σj µ Ajh
Aj(1− twj)
¶σj−1#−σj/(σj−1)
. (18)
(17) is a key equation for the model because it gives the dependence of
market sectors on policy. For given taxes and subsidies, employment shares
are driven by technology and preferences. Under the plausible restriction
ε < 1, the less productive sectors attract relatively bigger shares. Policy
influences employment shares in two ways. If two sectors are equally taxed
(tj = t1), policy influences their relative size only because of the substitutions
between home and market production. In a general equilibrium there is a
switch of hours of work from the taxed market sector to the untaxed home
sector that produces close substitutes. Sectors with closer home substitutes
suﬀer bigger losses of demand and employment than sectors with less good
home substitutes. From (17) it is clear that the condition for this intuition
to go through is ε/σj < 1, that is, that the elasticity of substitution between
home and market goods should be bigger than the elasticity of substitution
across market goods.
9To see the intuition, suppose the goods are perfect substitutes, then σj → ∞ and
all production moves to the more productive location. If σj = 0 the same quantity of
each good needs to be produced and consumed, and so more labor is employed in the less
productive location to compensate for the higher productivity in the other location.
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A second impact of policy on market shares is due to non-uniform taxa-
tion, because of social subsidies. If tj < t1, as would be the case if sector j is
subsidized and sector 1 is not, the relative employment of sector j for given
marketization is higher because of a switch of demand from the taxed sector
to the subsidized one. The extent of this switch depends on the elasticity of
substitution across market goods, ε.
The model makes strong predictions about two features of sectoral allo-
cations that can be confronted with data. First, the relative employment
shares in (17) depend on expenditure tax diﬀerentials and on market-home
substitutions. Second, the marketization in (16) depends on the tax wedge
applying to the sector. We now discuss the data needed to quantify these
two predictions.
2 Data derivation and description
Time use surveys have proliferated recently but with very minor exceptions
they are still mainly one-oﬀ surveys that follow similar principles across coun-
tries and over time. The United States began an annual survey in 2003 and
the European Union is in the process of setting up Europe-wide standards
for regular surveys across the European Union. However, for the purposes
of this study we are restricted to a small number of surveys; we selected one
survey for as many countries of the OECD as we could find, undertaken as
close to the turn of the millennium as possible. For most countries this was
the only available information.
Time use surveys record “market work” as the aggregate of the number
of hours spent at the place of work, time taken to travel to work and any
other activities related to market work, such as working at home in evenings
or weekends, job search, reading literature connected with the job etc. For
this reason market work reported in time use surveys exceeds hours of work
reported in household or employer surveys. In the countries of our sample
the mean log diﬀerence between market work reported in time use surveys
and the total hours reported by employers over a comparable period of time
(and including government employment and education) is 27.3, with standard
deviation 4.7, so diﬀerences across countries are of a comparable order of
magnitude.
Time use surveys, however, despite very detailed reporting of the kind
of activities done away from the market, do not report the occupational or
industrial breakdown of market hours. The source of the industrial break-
down of hours of work that is comparable across countries is the EU KLEMS
database, which is employer-based. We use this survey to get the percent-
12
Table 2:
The percentage distribution of aggregate hours of work
Country market home Country market home
Belgium 27 73 Ireland 39 61
Germany 33 67 Australia 40 60
France 34 66 Canada 42 58
Italy 34 66 Portugal 42 58
Spain 34 66 USA 43 57
New Zealand 35 65 Denmark 43 57
Sweden 36 64 Norway 44 56
Netherlands 38 62 Japan 49 51
Finland 38 62 Korea 56 44
UK 39 61
Market hours are mainly from EU KLEMS and they are the average over 1994-2003. See
the Appendix. Home hours are from time use surveys, one for each country, taken around
2000.
age distribution of total market hours across the model’s three sectors. The
absolute number of hours is needed only in the marketization equations of
sectors 2 and 3, and we also obtain them from the same source.10
Consider first the distribution of aggregate hours of market and home
work in the nineteen countries in our sample.11 Table 2 shows the per-
centage distribution across the nineteen countries of the sample, using the
employer sources for market hours and time use surveys for home hours. The
table shows wide variations across countries, with the central and southern
European countries having the smallest percentages of market hours and the
two Asian countries the largest market shares. Belgium and Japan-Korea
are outliers at either end, with the market share in Korea more than twice
as much as that in Belgium.
10We could obtain an absolute number of sectoral market work from time use surveys
by multiplying the EU KLEMS share of each sector by the total in the time use surveys.
But doing this may artificially increase the negative correlation between market hours in
the sector and home hours due to any measurement errors. We put the model through a
more stringent test by taking market hours and home hours from diﬀerent sources, even
though the former excludes auxiliary activities such as travel to work, whereas the latter
includes them.
11Full definitions, year of the survey and source are given in the data Appendix.
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Table 3:
The three sectors of market work
production and business services health other services
agriculture
and allied wholesale trade
health and
social work
sale, motor repairs
retail trade
mining and
quarrying
air transport,
post and telecom
hotels and
restaurants
manufacturing
finance, insurance,
real estate and
business services
inland transport
water transport
aux. transport
gas, electricity,
water
membership
organizations,
media activities
refuse disposal
recreational,
other personal
construction
All economic sectors in EU KLEMS are included except for public administration, defence
and compulsory social security (L) and education (M). The very small sector private house-
holds with employed persons (P) is also excluded from the analysis because of apparent
inconsistencies in the data.
EU KLEMS gives hours of work for two-digit sectors with very few gaps
for most countries, and covers all countries in the sample except for Canada,
Norway, and New Zealand, for which we used other sources. We grouped
the two-digit sectors into the model’s three sectors according to the classi-
fications in Table 3. The market activities in the sub-sectors included in
sector 3 broadly correspond to the home-production activities reported in
time use surveys, e.g., hours of work in the retail sector correspond to time
spent shopping in time use surveys, restaurants match time spent cooking,
etc. For sector 2, all time use surveys report hours of childcare, which is
a close substitute for market-based childcare, and most also report a much
smaller number of hours for care of other dependents. Given this informa-
tion, ideally we would have wanted to split the sector into two, one for health
services such as hospital treatment, which has no home substitutes, and one
for caring services, with home substitutes. However, this is not possible with
the available data sets, so we treat the aggregate of health and social work
as the market activity, with childcare and adult household care as its close
home substitute. The overall figure for adult care is very small, and mostly
done by older age groups (over 65s), so our home production time for care is
dominated by childcare, which is well measured in all time use surveys.
Government employment and education are excluded from the analysis.
Our aggregate economy is made up of the sectors listed in Table 3 and we
study the determinants of the distribution of work among the three sectors
of this economy.
The average shares of each of our three sectors for the last ten years of the
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sample are shown in Figure 1. Sector 1 is the biggest sector in all countries,
but the most interesting fact that emerges from this figure is that despite its
size, the cross-sectional variation in the share of sector 1 is less than that in
the other sectors. This is consistent with our model, to the extent that the
two asymmetric influences on hours of market work, the subsidization of some
activities and the market-home production substitution, impact directly on
the other two sectors.
The largest shares of sector 2 hours are in the four Scandinavian countries,
and the smallest in the two Mediterranean and two Asian countries covered
by the sample. Although naturally no country is exactly the same as another
in its treatment of welfare, there are country clusters with broadly similar
policies that correspond to the rankings in Figure 1 (see Esping-Andersen
1990, 1999). The Scandinavian countries have the highest levels of overall
taxation but they use a large part of the revenue to subsidize market-based
social services. They have the largest sector 2 share. Next come the con-
tinental European countries, which also have high taxation and subsidize
heavily social services but not to the extent of the Scandinavian countries.
Anglo-Saxon countries have generally lower taxation and welfare transfers,
so they have relatively larger sectors 1 and 3, and correspondingly smaller
sector 2 share. Finally, southern European countries do not give support
to market-based social care and have the smallest relative size for sector
2. Japan and Korea are in line with southern European countries with no
subsidy to market-based social care.
Policy is characterized by three types of instruments, taxes, health and
social care subsidies, and lump-sum transfers. Lump-sum transfers are not
relevant for our analysis but the other two instruments are. The tax rates on
labor income, consumer spending and employment can be calculated from
national accounts data given in OECD publications (see the Appendix). For
each country we also calculated the employment subsidy rate as the ratio
of total spending on “active employment measures” to the wage bill. The
combination of these taxes net of the employment subsidy gives the tax wedge
for sectors 1 and 3.
For the health and social work sector, diﬀerent countries follow diﬀerent
subsidization policies, and detailed case by case modeling for each country
is not feasible. We follow a common approach to defining the subsidy rate,
which captures the extent of subsidization of this sector. We calculated two
alternative subsidy rates, one applying to social care only and one including
health subsidies.
The main substitution between market and home is in social care, which
is primarily childcare. Our first subsidy measure includes the value of “ben-
efits in kind” in social care, reported in SOCX, which is mainly the money
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governments spent on subsidizing day care centers and homes for older peo-
ple. The second subsidy adds to this health spending on benefits in kind.
Health spending is on average much larger than social care spending but it
encompasses both medical services and drugs and medical equipment, which
are not part of the output of the health sector. Health expenditure data for
the United States shows that about half the health spending is on drugs and
equipment and the other half on medical services.12 We applied this frac-
tion to all countries and so divided by 2 the total health subsidy reported
in SOCX. Adding the result to social care spending yields our second health
and social care subsidy.
The subsidy rate on health and social care is defined as the ratio of
each subsidy amount calculated as in the preceding paragraph, to the gross
output of the health and social work sector. As the value-added of private
health and social care services is not taxed, the subsidy rate calculated for
each country is the net expenditure tax on the model’s sector 2, which is a
negative number in all countries. The simple correlation coeﬃcient between
the two calculated subsidy rates is 0.87, so countries that heavily subsidize
social care also subsidize health more generously, and conversely. Our results
are very similar for the two rates and for space reasons the detailed results
that we report are for the narrower definition only, mentioning only briefly
some results for the broader measure. We prefer the narrower definition
because the main market-home substitution is in social care and there is less
arbitrariness in the construction of this rate.
Figure 2 shows the calculated tax wedge for health and social work, based
on the narrower subsidy that excludes health, and the tax wedge for the rest
of the economy. Countries are sorted according to the diﬀerential between
the two rates. As expected, the Scandinavian countries have the biggest
diﬀerential between the two tax rates and the south European and North
American countries the smallest. A striking feature of the data shown in
Figure 2 is the cross-country variation in the two rates. There is much more
variation in social subsidies than in total taxes: the total tax wedge ranges
from nearly 50% in Sweden to 27% in Korea, in contrast to the tax wedge
for health and social work, which ranges from −40% in Norway to +26% in
Italy.13 The correlation coeﬃcient between the two tax wedges is equal to
12The Consumption Expenditure Survey (CEX) of the United States for 2003 gives the
following expenditure breakdowns for health care: 3.1% on health insurance, 1.4% on
medical services, 1.1% on drugs and 0.3% on medical supplies. Excluding insurance, the
spending on medical services is 50% of total health spending. Insurance spending can be
assumed to be in the same proportions as private spending.
13In all countries, the health and social care wedge is made up of a negative expenditure
tax (the social care subsidy) and two positive taxes, the income tax and the employment
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−0.41, picking up the obvious fact that tax rates are higher in the countries
that give more social care subsidies.14
3 Parameter values
The key equations used in the predictions of the market shares are (16), (17)
and (18). Equation (17) shows that the impact of the parameters on the
ratio of hours can be divided into the impact of the substitution across the
three market goods and the impact of the substitution between market and
home production. However, because the expenditure taxes in sectors 1 and
3 are the same, the relative size of sector 3 to sector 1 is unaﬀected by the
cross-market substitution. Policy influences on the ratio of hours in sector 3
to sector 1 work only through the market-home substitution. Equation (16)
shows that this substitution is influenced by the common tax wedge of the
two sectors.
We study the impact of policy on market shares by investigating each
substitution channel separately - across market goods due to the ε elasticity,
for given home production time, and between market and home due to the
σj elasticity. The elasticity values that we used in the computations were
chosen as follows.
Beginning with σj, we have estimates in the literature of the elasticity of
substitution between all of home production and all market goods. These
estimates are in the range 1.5 − 2.3.15 In our model σj is the elasticity of
substitution between market and home goods in two sub-sectors of the econ-
omy, where there might be diﬀerent substitution possibilities. For sector 3,
we would expect the substitution possibilities to be stronger than for the
economy as a whole, because of the selection of goods for inclusion in that
sector. In view of this, a value in the upper range of the aggregate estimates
is more appropriate. We choose σ3 = 2.3 as our benchmark, although even
higher values might be appropriate. For the health and social work sector,
the substitution elasticity is likely to depend on the breakdown of the sector
between the health and social work components, and on family views about
the closeness of market-provided childcare to family-provided care. We have
tax. Depending on their relative size, the outcome could be either positive or negative.
14Recently, Ohanian, Raﬀo and Rogerson (2008) used a diﬀerent method from ours to
construct a whole-economy tax wedge for a sub-sample of the OECD countries in our
sample. The correlation coeﬃcient between our tax wedge for sectors 1 and 3 and theirs
is 0.88. The only apparent diﬀerence in the rank comparisons is that their method makes
Spain and Australia lower tax countries than our methods do.
15See Rupert, Rogerson and Wright (1995), McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright (1997)
and Chang and Schorfheide (2003).
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no information from direct estimates for either and we used the same value
as for sector 3 in our benchmark, σ2 = 2.3, although we report also results
for lower values.
The elasticity ε is the price elasticity of the three consumption aggregates
in our model. In estimates based on models without home production, this is
also the price elasticity of demand. But with home production the estimated
elasticity is a weighted average of the σ and ε elasticities, with weights that
depend on all the parameters of the model. So on the assumption that
σ > ε, in a model with home production the ε elasticity should be less than
the estimated overall price elasticity of demand.
Estimates of the price elasticity of demand for service goods or sub-groups
within services are all below 1, and usually in the range 0− 0.3.16 More re-
cently, Herrendorf, Rogerson and Valentinyi (2009), addressing this issue with
consumption expenditure data for the United States for 1947-2007, show that
the expenditure estimate of the elasticity of substitution across agriculture,
manufacturing and service goods is around 0.8. But since our production
functions are for value added, a more appropriate elasticity is the one de-
rived for the value-added components for each sector. For this estimate they
derive an elasticity close to 0.
Given that the ε of our model should be less than the estimated demand
elasticities in econometric studies because of the home production compo-
nent, and it should be closer to the value-added estimate of Herrendorf,
Rogerson and Valentinyi (2009), the upper value estimate of 0.3 of the econo-
metric studies seems to be an upper bound for this elasticity, with 0 a lower
bound.
4 A quantitative illustration
We begin our quantitative applications by illustrating the interaction between
the cross-market and market-home substitutions that drive our results, with
reference to the example discussed in the introduction and summarized in
Table 1.
There are four tax variables that have an impact on allocations, the ex-
penditure taxes t1 and t2, and the tax wedges tw1 and tw2. Sector 3 has the
same tax variables as sector 1. Table 4 shows the sample means for these tax
variables and the values that are used in the illustration. The latter set are
drawn from the rates calculated for Sweden and Japan, the extreme countries
shown in Table 1.
16See Falvey and Gemmell (1996), Summers (1985) and Blundell, Pashardes and Weber
(1993) for micro-econometric estimates.
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Table 4:
Alternative tax regimes
Tax means lo uniform hi uniform lo subsidy hi subsidy
t1, t3 0.21 0.13 0.22 0.13 0.22
t2 −0.18 0.13 0.22 −0.10 −0.48
tw1, tw3 0.38 0.28 0.49 0.28 0.49
tw2 0.07 0.28 0.49 0.10 −0.22
The column headed means shows the sample means. Lo uniform applies a uniform tax to
all sectors, with the level set at the value for Japan for sectors 1 and 3. Hi uniform does
the same but sets the tax rates at the levels for Sweden. The lo subsidy column gives the
actual rates for Japan and the hi subsidy column gives the actual rates for Sweden.
Solving the model for the sample means and for ε = 0.3 and σ2 = σ3 =
2.3, we obtain the sector shares shown in the second column of Table 5. When
taxation is uniform across the three sectors (i.e., the health and social work
subsidy is ignored), and is increased from the low Japanese rates to the high
Swedish rates, the distribution of work shifts from the sectors with home
substitutes, 2 and 3, to the sector without substitutes, 1. The home-market
substitution is the only driving force behind the changes in the market shares
when taxation is uniform. Sectors 2 and 3 lose hours in similar proportions,
but because sector 3 is the bigger one, most of the fall in the percentage share
is in this sector. So if, for example, Sweden had the same taxes as at present,
but did not use part of the revenue to subsidize health and social care, its
health and social work sector would have occupied only 4.2% of total market
hours, with the bulk of care taking place in the home.
When the subsidies for sector 2 are introduced, in the last two columns
of table 5, both other shares fall, approximately by the same proportion, and
the share of sector 2 increases dramatically. The model predictions for Swe-
den are very close to the data shown in Table 1. Sector 1 gains from the high
tax at the expense of sectors 2 and 3, which have home substitutes, and then
sector 2 gains from the subsidy at the expense of sectors 1 and 3. Sector 1
share is almost unaﬀected by the policy, because the two substitution chan-
nels oﬀset each other. But sector 3 share falls dramatically to accommodate
the rise in sector 2 share, because both substitution forces act in the same
direction. In contrast, because Japan has low taxation, it has a high sector
3 share (but not as high as it would have had with no taxes at all). The
model’s predictions are again very close to the data shown in Table 1, and
the economic forces behind them are the same.
It is clear from the discussion and from the computations shown in Table
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Table 5:
Sector shares under alternative tax regimes
Sector means lo uniform hi uniform hi subsidy lo subsidy
1 63.4 61.8 72.8 64.2 60.1
2 9.7 5.9 4.2 15.5 8.4
3 26.9 32.3 23.0 20.3 31.5
5, that the home-market substitution is crucial in explaining the large varia-
tions observed in the share of sector 3 across the countries in the sample. If
we assume that the elasticity of substitution between market goods and home
goods is zero, we get for Sweden, for example, respective shares of the three
sectors of 62.2, 10.4 and 27.4. Compared with the results in the hi-subsidy
case in Table 5, we find that the share of sector 1 is less by 2 percentage
points, but the share of sector 2 is less by 5 points and that of sector 3 is
higher by 7 points. The value of ε, the elasticity of substitution across goods,
required to bring the prediction of health and social work up to the 15.5%
level of Table 5 is 2.1, but at that level (and σj = 0 for both j = 2, 3) the
share of sector 1 is 55 and the share of sector 3 is 30.5, which are far oﬀ the
data points.
This example shows that in order to reconcile the small country diﬀerences
in the share of sector 1, with the large diﬀerences in the shares of the other two
sectors, the model requires a low ε elasticity and a high σj elasticity, especially
for sector 3 - consistent with the empirical estimates of these elasticities.
5 Explaining country diﬀerences: Substitutions
across market goods
If we shut down the market-home substitution channel (e.g., by evaluating the
model solutions at ψj = 1), the cross-country hours distribution could diﬀer
for two reasons: diﬀerent tax rates across sectors or diﬀerent productivity
ratios. For ψj = 1 equations (17) and (18) yield,
lj
l1
=
µ
ωj
ω1
¶εµAj
A1
¶−(1−ε)µ
1 + tj
1 + t1
¶−ε
. (19)
For sector 2, t2 < t1 in all countries in the sample, but for sector 3, t3 =
t1. Taxes therefore cannot predict diﬀerences in the ratio l3/l1 without the
market-home substitution, but they could predict diﬀerences in the ratio
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l2/l1. These diﬀerences are measured by the last term in (19). In deviations
from log means we obtain, for each country in the sample,
ln
l2
l1
−E ln l2
l1
= −ε
µ
ln
1 + tj
1 + t1
− E ln 1 + tj
1 + t1
¶
(20)
where E in front of the log denotes the sample mean. We use (20) to obtain
a prediction for the ratio l2/l1 for each country.
The predictions for ε = 0.3, which we consider to be at the upper end of
the most reasonable values at this level of aggregation, have a good correla-
tion with the data but do not have enough variation. The simple correlation
coeﬃcient between the prediction obtained from (20) and the data for the 19
countries is 0.86. The standard deviation of the data, however, is seven times
as big as the standard deviation of the prediction. The conclusion that can
be reached from this is that the impact of taxes and subsidies on the relative
size of sector 2 is significant and in the right direction. But the quantita-
tive impact of the calculated tax rates when only market substitutions are
considered is too small to explain the data.
We show in Figure 3 the predictions for market shares obtained from
(20). Applying the methodology of (20) to sector 3 as well gives a “naive”
prediction for ln l3/l1 at the sample means. Using the two predictions in (8)
we obtain a prediction for the share of market hours in sector 2, shown in
figure 3a. The lines drawn in this figure are the 450 line and lines for the
sample means of the data and prediction.17 An “ideal” prediction would have
all the points lying along the 450 line, whereas a naive prediction would have
them along the sample mean line. The predictions shown in figure 3a are
clearly superior to the “naive” predictions, but they are a long way from the
ideal ones. The mean absolute distance of the predictions from the 450 line
is 2.68, compared with the naive prediction’s 3.02.
The predictions in Figure 3a were derived with the tax rate obtained when
only social work subsidies are taken into account. The predictions with the
broader measure of subsidies that includes also half of health spending by
the government are very similar and not reported. The correlation coeﬃcient
between the prediction for l2/l1 with the data is ρ = 0.81, but the standard
deviation of the data is 5.2 times as large as the standard deviation of the
prediction.
The substitution margin that drives the results in Figure 3a is across
market sectors only. It predicts that as health and social care are subsidized,
17The share predictions were adjusted to have the same mean as the data for shares.
(Recall that they were derived from the log deviations from sample mean for the ratio
l2/l1.)
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and the other sectors taxed, consumers switch their consumption from the
other market goods to health and social care. Our finding is that such a
switch takes place, but because health and social care are not suﬃciently
close substitutes to other market goods there cannot be large substitutions,
even when there are large subsidies to health and social care. It is natural
to conclude from this that had there been more substitution possibilities the
model would have performed better. A log-linear regression estimate of (20)
gives ε = 1.7 for the whole sample and ε = 1.4 when Korea is excluded from
the estimation, with a large increase in R2. The best fitting line to the share
data is between these, at about 1.5. Figure 3b shows the predicted series for
the share of sector 2 for ε = 1.5. A regression line through the points virtually
coincides with the 450 line, and gives a good fit (R2 = 0.72), which shows
that the best-fitting specification explains a large part of the variation in the
employment share of health and social work. The absolute mean deviation
of these predictions from the 450 line (including Korea, which is an outlier)
is 1.76, only 58% of the distance of the data points from the sample mean.
However, the caveat remains that the value of the elasticity required to give
this fit is far oﬀ the range of plausible values, as we discussed earlier on.
One might still ask if a simpler model that ignores home production,
combined with a high value for ε, is a useful shortcut that might explain the
data. The answer is that it does not, because of the symmetric way in which
this simplified model influences the other two sectors. This goes against the
evidence shown in Figure 1, where there is more variation in the share of
sector 3, and its share is better correlated with the share of sector 2 than is
the share of sector 1. Computing the implied share of sector 3 for ε = 0.3
and ε = 1.5 improves the prediction of the sector 3 share over the mean, but
only marginally. The absolute deviation of the data from the sample mean
for sector 3 is 2.84, for ε = 0.3 it is 2.79 and for the best fitting ε = 1.5
it is 2.43. This is further evidence that although substitution across market
goods contributes to the cross-country variation in employment shares, it is
not the only (or even main) explanation of such diﬀerentials.
Of course, it is possible that the part of the variation not explained by
cross-market substitutions can be explained by productivity diﬀerences across
countries. To investigate the contribution of productivity diﬀerences we re-
quire data for the productivity ratios in sectors 2 and 3, Aj/A1. Given the
diﬃculty of obtaining good estimates of relative productivity diﬀerentials
in each sector, which are also comparable across countries, we approach the
problem in reverse. We calculate the productivity diﬀerences required if mar-
ket productivity is to explain the observed diﬀerentials in the cross-country
hours distributions in the absence of market-home substitutions, given the
observed tax diﬀerentials for sector 2.
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From (19) we obtain the following equation for the productivity ratios:
Aj
A1
=
"µ
ωj
ω1
¶−εµ lj
l1
¶µ
1 + tj
1 + t1
¶ε#−1/(1−ε)
. (21)
As with the tax predictions, we take logs and compute the log diﬀerence of
Aj/A1 from the log mean, required to explain the cross-country diﬀerences
in lj/l1, given the tax ratios. We normalize the mean to 1 for both sectors 2
and 3 and report the results in Figure 4.
The required productivity ratios in most cases are implausibly large. The
best way to see the intuition behind these results, given that they are ratios
of ratios, is to conjecture that because tradeables are concentrated mainly
in sector 1, productivity diﬀerences across the open economies of the OECD
should be less for sector 1 than for the other sectors. Suppose for the sake
of the intuitive argument that sector 1 productivities are the same in all
countries. Figure 4 then shows that in order to explain the larger relative
employment in health and social work in Denmark, hourly productivity in
that country in health and social work has to be half of the sample mean.
Similar results hold for the other Scandinavian countries. Similarly, in order
to explain the smaller size of this sector in Spain, hourly productivity in that
country has to be 65% more than the average hourly productivity in the
OECD sample. The most extreme case is Korea, where the health and social
work sector is so small that productivity in that sector needs to be nearly 8
times as high as the mean to explain it.18 The diﬀerentials required for the
allocations in sector 3 are of a similar order of magnitude.
Such diﬀerences in relative productivities are implausible, given measured
productivity diﬀerences. But we find even less plausible the requirement
that the productivity diﬀerences in sectors 2 and 3 should be negatively
correlated. The simple correlation coeﬃcient of the points shown in Figure
4 is −0.28, and if the two outliers, Portugal and Korea, are excluded, it
rises to −0.72. Thus, if productivity diﬀerences are to explain the observed
diﬀerences in hours, the countries that are more eﬃcient than the average in
sector 2 have to be less eﬃcient in sector 3. There is no reason for such a
ranking in productivities. Of course, the reason that the model requires this
negative correlation is that the countries that have large social sectors, like
the Scandinavians, are also the countries that have small unskilled service
18Korea is an outlier not shown in figure 4. Undoubtedly, trade and its more recent
development play a role in explaining the large manufacturing sector in that country.
Nevertheless, the productivity diﬀerence required to explain its relative sector 3 size is not
an outlier, so the feature that drives the very high productivity requirement in the health
and social work sector is the very small size of that sector.
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sectors, so the required productivities have to go in opposite directions. It
is again related to the asymmetric substitution from the other sectors into
sector 2, that we pointed out was a problem for the cross-market substitution
explanation of the hours diﬀerences.
6 Substitutions betweenmarket and home pro-
duction
When we allow for the substitution between market and home goods, our
model can explain with conventional parameters both the bigger impact of
policy on the hours distribution across countries and the asymmetric response
of sectors 1 and 3. We investigate first the impact of home production on
the hours distribution whatever the source of diﬀerences in home production
across countries. By doing this we are allowing for the possibility that our
quantitative model of home production does not capture all the influences
on home production, in particular on activities such as childcare.19 We fol-
low this analysis by investigating the impact of policy on the cross-country
diﬀerences in home production.
Formally, in this section we are fixing the marketization of time lj/ljh for
sectors 2 and 3 at the observed values in all countries, and derive the opti-
mal allocations across the three market sectors, conditional on the observed
marketizations. By fixing the marketization of time, we are eﬀectively also
fixing the marketization of consumption, so the question that we are inves-
tigating in this section is whether equation (17) does a good job predicting
the employment shares, given the observed values for the tax ratios and the
marketization ratios. The only diﬃculty with this prediction is that the mar-
ketization of consumption is not observed, so we need to replace it with a
term that has the observed marketization of time in its place.
Making use of the production functions for market and home goods, we
obtain,
ci
c˜i
=
"
ψi + (1− ψi)
µ
ci
cih
¶−(σi−1)/σi#−σi/(σi−1)
= ψ−σi/(σi−1)i
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1
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µ
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¶−(σi−1)/σi µ li
lih
¶−(σi−1)/σi#−σi/(σi−1)
(22)
19See the discussion that follows in section 7.
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Substitution of (22) into (17) yields
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where xj ≡ (1/ψj − 1) (Aj/Ajh)−(σj−1)/σj is a function of preference and
productivity parameters. Taking a log-linear approximation to the last term
of (23) about the sample mean, we obtain,
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where z¯j is the sample mean of zj = −((σj − 1) /σj) ln (lj/ljh) .
As before, we use the model to make predictions of the allocations across
countries in deviations from sample means. Combining (23) and (24), we
obtain
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For sector 2, each country’s deviation from the sample mean is the sum of
two terms. The expenditure tax terms that were computed before from (20),
and a second term that is due to home production. For sector 3 the only
term in the prediction is the home production term in (25), as there are no
tax distortions between sectors 1 and 3 and t3 = t1.
The coeﬃcient xjez¯j/(1+xjez¯j) is a number between 0 and 1 but we have
no information on its value, being a combination of preference and technology
parameters over market and home consumption. If this coeﬃcient is 0, home
production plays no role in the allocation of market work, so it is obviously
important for our results. However, it turns out that the results are robust
to a large range of values for this coeﬃcient, once it exceeds a low value such
as 0.2. We adopted the following approach to finding a value for it. z¯j can be
calculated directly from the data on home and market production. To get a
value for xj we assume that the productivity ratio Aj/Ajh is 1 in both sectors,
as these are low-skill services, and that the preference ratio (1 − ψj)/ψj is
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equal to the average ratio of the shares of market to home production. These
targets hold exactly for σj = 1, but we do not impose this restriction on σj
in any of the other calculations. The outcome for each sector is,20
x2ez¯2
1 + x2ez¯2
σ2 − ε
σ2
= 0.64 (26)
x3ez¯3
1 + x3ez¯3
σ3 − ε
σ3
= 0.80. (27)
The predictions for the ratios l2/l1 and l3/l1, when the values in (26) and
(27) are used, are now much closer to the data than they were without the
home production terms. For sector 2, the standard deviation of the data
series is only 1.33 times the standard deviation of the predicted series, and
the correlation between the two series is 0.89. Moreover, these predictions
are virtually identical to the ones for a lower σ2. For σ2 = 1.5, the ratio
between the standard deviation of the data to the prediction is 1.49, and
the correlation between the two series remains at 0.89. For sector 3 the stan-
dard deviation of the data is only 0.44 times the standard deviation of the
prediction, with correlation 0.55, but this is largely due to Korea, which is
an outlier. If Korea is omitted from the sample, the ratio of the standard
deviations becomes 0.62 and their correlation coeﬃcient is also 0.62.
We now use these predictions, including Korea, to derive predictions for
the sector market shares. These are shown in Figures 5a and 5b for σ2 =
σ3 = 2.3.21 The model fits the data well for both sectors, except for the
Korea outlier in sector 3. As before, the three lines are the 450 line and
the lines for the sample means. The model picks up well the Scandinavian
group of countries in both sectors, as well as the smaller deviations across the
other countries. The large majority of countries, and all the ones with large
deviations from the sample mean, are pushed towards the 450 line by the
model. The average absolute diﬀerence between the data and the prediction
for sector 2 is 1.45, compared with the deviation between data and sample
mean of 3.02. In sector 3, the model is also pushing the vast majority of
countries towards the 450 line but the averages are distorted because of the
Korea outlier. The average absolute deviation between data and prediction
is 3.14, compared with the average distance between data and sample mean
of 2.84. But when Korea is omitted, the model’s average distance from the
20A log linear regression estimate of (25) over the cross section of 19 countries gives the
following estimates for this coeﬃcient: 0.67 for sector 2, with p value 0.0003, and 0.34 for
sector 3, with p value 0.0007. The regression for sector 2 also gives an estimate for ε, but
still one that we would regard to be too high, 0.77, with p value 0.03.
21The predictions for σ2 = 1.5 are virtually indistinguishable from the ones shown.
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data goes down to 2.64.22
7 Can taxes and subsidies explain marketiza-
tion?
Can taxes explain the cross-country diﬀerences in the marketization of time?
The key equation of the model is (16), which makes the marketization of
time a log-linear function of preference parameters, productivity parameters
and the tax wedge. As in previous sections, we assume that preferences and
productivities are common across the countries of the sample and investigate
the extent to which diﬀerences in the tax wedge can explain the observed
diﬀerences in the marketization of time. Figures 6a and 6b show the results
with the elasticities of substitution previously used, 2.3 in both sectors.23 The
model picks up well the diﬀerence between the Scandinavian countries and
the rest of the sample in the marketization of family care, but the elasticity
used (or the specification, which assumes common technologies and prefer-
ences) cannot distinguish between the other countries on the basis of the tax
wedge alone. The correlation between data and prediction with σ2 = 2.3
is 0.64. Results are virtually identical for a lower elasticity of substitution.
For σ2 = 1.5, the correlation improves slightly to 0.65 but the graph of the
predictions against the data is indistinguishable from Figure 6a. Similarly,
when the broader subsidy that includes health is included, the results are
also very similar to the ones shown in Figure 6a. The correlation between
data and predictions for σ2 = 2.3 is 0.60 and rises to 0.63 when σ2 = 1.5.
In contrast, the marketization of other services is explained well by the
diﬀerent tax rates, with the exception of Korea, which is an outlier. As
before, the problem with this country is that its market hours in sector 3
are extremely high when compared with other countries, and with the lowest
home hours in the sample as well it yields a ratio of market to home that is
too high to be explained by policy alone.
One might speculate why the model fails to explain fully the marketiza-
22The problem with Korea is that it has extremely high marketization ratio in sector 3.
The model then predicts extremely high market share for this sector, but in the data it is
not as high because market hours are also very high for sector 1. None of the papers that
attempt to predict diﬀerences in market hours across countries with taxes include Korea
in their sample. The extremely high number of aggregate market hours in that country
would defy any prediction based on policy.
23Simple log-linear regressions of equation (16) with the 19 observations for sectors 2
and 3 give respectively σ2 = 1.3 (p = 0.057) and σ3 = 2.2 (p = 0.0005). This ranking is
consistent with our discussion in section 3.
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tion of family care with policy, in light of recent work on culture and social
norms. Our model points also to the ratio of market to home technology, and
to diﬀerences in tastes over home and market production, as additional in-
fluences on the market-to-home substitution. In some countries there might
be mistrust of government-sponsored childcare centres, or religion and other
social norms might dictate that the care of family members - pre-school chil-
dren or sick parents - should be done at home. Further work is needed to
test whether the reasons for the diﬀerences in the distribution of work not
explained by taxation are due to diﬀerences in tastes or technology, or to
other factors.24
8 Conclusions
We summarize the main findings as showing that the large diﬀerences in
the allocation of market work across the countries of the OECD can be
attributed to the diﬀerences in taxation, the subsidization of social work
and the market-home production substitution. Taxes and subsidies alone
without the market-home substitution explain some of the diﬀerences in the
allocation of time but not enough. Moreover, there are facts that they cannot
explain at all, such as the fact that the main diﬀerences in the allocation of
hours of work across countries are in two types of sectors, health and social
work and unskilled services. When the market-home substitution is included
in the model both can be explained, the larger response of market hours to
taxes and the fact that the main impact of taxes is on health and social care
and unskilled services, which have close home-produced substitutes.
The key mechanism of the model is two-fold. Taxes and subsidies cause
substitutions across market goods, with consumers switching from taxed
goods to subsidized ones. The elasticities involved here, however, are too
small to explain the diﬀerences that we see in the data. But the taxation
of market work makes people substitute home production for market pro-
duction, and this margin is powerful enough to explain larger responses of
market work to policy in sectors that produce goods that can also be pro-
duced at home. In addition, making use of data on home production from
time use surveys, we found that although taxation explains a large part of
the diﬀerences that we see in home production time across the OECD, there
are also unexplained diﬀerences, especially in family care. These unexplained
24Several writers have written about the diﬀerences in the way that OECD citizens
view the role of social care and family-related work in the home and the market. See for
example, Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), and Algan and Cahuc (2009), where questions
related to religious beliefs and culture are investigated.
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diﬀerences, which may be due to diﬀerences in tastes or technology, also con-
tribute to the explanation of the diﬀerences in the allocation of market work
across the countries in our sample.
9 Data appendix
Time use data
Time use data record activities at regular intervals (e.g. every 15 minutes)
during a 24-hour day. For the purposes of this paper we extracted from
time use surveys two numbers, time spent on caring for a child or an adult
household member, including related travel time, and other home work time.
Home work in time use surveys includes activities that could be dele-
gated but are done by members of the household, either inside or outside
the home. The main activities are shopping, house and garden cleaning
and maintenance, cooking, laundry, pet care and car care. Travel time is
included with the corresponding activities, e.g. travel time to shops is in-
cluded in shopping. Childcare is a separate item. Caring for others within
the household is a separate item, although some surveys at our disposal did
not report separately this item. The item is small, accounting for less than
20% of childcare time, and where missing we constructed a series for it from
other information, as explained below. Caring for others outside the family
was reported separately by a very small number of surveys but we could
not get data for it for most countries. Where reported it was a very small
item. Most surveys included it with other small activities in “other voluntary
work”, a small item that is part of other home production time.
The main data source for the European countries is the Harmonised Eu-
ropean Time Use Survey (HETUS: https://www.testh2.scb.se/tus/tus/). It
was the result of a cooperation between a number or national statistical in-
stitutes and Eurostat in the 1990s, with the objective to harmonize time use
statistics in the European Union. The HETUS covers 9 of our 19 countries
around the year 2000. They are Belgium (1998), Finland (1999), France
(1998), Germany (2001), Italy (2002), Norway (2000), Spain (2002), Sweden
(2000, age group 20+) and the United Kingdom (2000). Detailed national
tables for each country are downloadable from the HETUS website. Each
national table reports time use of population by age. We compute the time
use for the 15+ category by weighting each group by its population size,
using population data from the United Nations,World Population Prospects
(http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=2).
The HETUS does not report explicitly the time taken for caring for house-
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hold members. We obtained accurate data from the national source used by
HETUS for Finland, Germany, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
For the other countries HETUS reports a residual aggregate of “other house-
hold work,” which includes caring for others as one of the main items. For
Belgium and Italy we used Spain’s ratio of “caring for others” to the HETUS
“other household work” to get the time of caring for others from the HETUS
residual. For France the HETUS residual was clearly misreported, as it was
1 minute a day for all age groups. We increased France’s childcare time by
Spain’s fraction of caring for others to childcare. Finally, for Sweden we
used the average decomposition of “other household work” for Norway and
Denmark to obtain the time for caring for others from the HETUS aggregate.
For the remaining 10 countries, we use national time use statistics, as
follows (in some cases, as indicated below, it was not possible to obtain data
for the 15+ category but for a near age group):
Australia: 1997 Time Use Survey conducted by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics (ABS). Tables are available from the publication, How Australians
Use Their Time 1997, available online through http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS.
Canada: General Social Survey (GSS) conducted by Statistics Canada in
1998 and available online through http://www.statcan.gc.ca/. Adult care is
included in a residual “other household work”. We used the US fractions to
decompose this item into caring for others and other items.
Denmark: Data are available only in Danish for 2001, age groups 15-
74, translated and tabulated for this paper by Jens Bonker of the Rockwool
Foundation Research Unit, Copenhagen (to whom we express our thanks).
Ireland: The Irish National Time-Use Survey 2005 is a pilot survey con-
ducted by Economic and Social Research Institute for the Department of
Justices, Equality and Law Reform. We obtained the time use table from
the publication, Time-Use in Ireland 2005: Survey Report. Age group 18+.
(http://www.ucd.ie/issda/dataset-info/timeuse.htm)
Japan: The 2001 Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities conducted
by the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications.
(http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/shakai/2001/unpaid/tabu.htm)
Korea: Data provided for this paper by the Korea Labor Institute, Seoul,
following a visit by one of the authors in 2008 (C Pissarides). Data for 1999,
age group 10+ (data also available for 2004 with virtually identical results).
Netherlands: Netherlands Institute for Social Research. At the time of
writing detailed tables were available online in English but now discontinued.
We obtained our aggregates from Burda et al. (2008), age group 20-74.
New Zealand: Time Use Statistics 1999 prepared by Statistics New
Zealand, tables downloaded from: http://www.stats.govt.nz/. Only total
family care is available (childcare and adult care).
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Portugal: 1999 Time Use Survey, conducted by Instituto Nacional De
Estatistica (INE). Table and document (in Portuguese) are downloadable
from: http://www.ine.pt/
United States: The American Time Use Survey 2003 by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/tus/).
Hours of work
Sectoral hours were obtained mainly from the database Productivity in the
European Union: A Comparative Industry Approach (EUKLEMS), http://www.euklems.net/,
file extension .08I, released March 2008. The following KLEMS sectors are
in each one of our sectors:
Sector 1 includes KLEMS Sectors A (agriculture, hunting, forestry), B
(fishing), C (mining and quarrying), D (manufacturing), E (electricity, gas,
water), F (construction), G51 (wholesale trade), I62 (air transport), I64 (post
and telecommunications), J (financial intermediation), K (real estate, rent-
ing and business services), O91 (activities of membership organizations nec)
O911t2 (media activities)
Sector 2 is the KLEMS sector N (health and social work)
Sector 3 includes the KLEMS sectors G50 (sale and maintenance of motor
vehicles and motorcycles), G52 (retail trade), H (hotels and restaurants), I60
(inland transport), I61 (other water transport), I63 (other supporting travel
activities), O90 (sewage and refuse disposal), O92 (recreational, cultural and
sporting activities), O923t7 (other recreational activities), O93 (other service
activities)
Three countries are not in KLEMS: Canada, Norway, and New Zealand.
We constructed their shares from the KLEMS predecessor, the OECD Struc-
tural Analysis Database (STAN), following the same sector decomposition.
Some data entries are missing. In all cases the missing entries were for
very small sectors. We constructed the missing data series by assuming that
the shares of the missing series within its sector were the same as the corre-
sponding shares in neighboring countries with a similar industrial structure.
In most cases the missing data were for media activities (sector O92 1&2).
In the United States, where this sector is relatively large, it accounts for
about 30% of hours in sector O, which accounts for about 6% of total hours.
The “similar” country shares used to construct the media sector in the coun-
tries that it is missing were selected as follows: for Denmark we used the
media’s hours share for Finland. For Italy we used Spain’s. For Japan we
used Korea’s. For the Netherlands we used the UK’s. For Sweden we used
Finland’s.
STAN does not have a breakdown of hours for New Zealand but it has
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total hours. We obtained employment data for industrial sectors by status
(part time or full time) from the website of Statistics New Zealand, to cal-
culate the shares of employment in individual sectors (weighting part-time
employment by 25/40), and then multiplied these shares by total weekly
hours for the 15+ population to obtain hours in each sector.
For Canada no data are available for the decomposition of sector O, we
use US’s shares to allocate hours within sector O sub-sectors. Similarly for
Norway, we used Finland’s shares to allocate total sector O hours to its
components.
The population aged 15 and above that was used to derive per capita
hours was obtained fromWorld Developments Indicators.
Taxes
The tax rates were calculated from the data given in Nickell (2006), the
OECD/CEP data set. Briefly, they are as follows.
The employment tax rate is defined as ESS/(IE-ESS), with ESS equal to
employers’ social security contributions and IE equal to total compensation
for employees. ESS is available from the OECD National Accounts and IE
from the OECD Revenue Statistics.
The direct tax rate is defined as DT/HCR, with DT equal to income tax
plus employees’ social security contributions and HCR equal to household
current receipts. Income tax and employees’ social security contributions
were taken from the OECD Revenue Statistics. HCR was calculated from the
OECDNational Accounts as the sum of compensation of employees, property
income, social contributions and benefits and other current transfers.
The indirect tax rate is defined as (TX-SB)/CC, with TX equal to indirect
taxes, SB equal to subsidies and CC household final expenditures. All three
were taken from OECD National Accounts.
For the employment subsidy we obtained total spending on active labour
market measures (code 600) from the OECD Social Expenditure Database
(SOCX) and divided it by total employee compensation from KLEMS. Data
are missing for New Zealand, and we set this rate at the Australian rate
(generally, this is a very small number for all countries).
The rates used in the paper were averages for 1994-2003. Most countries
had complete data sets and all countries had at least some entries for those
years, which were used to arrive at averages. The only exception is Korea,
for which there were no tax data at all. For this country only we used the
tax data available at the OECD National Accounts: Korea.
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Social subsidies
The social subsidies are available in SOCX, 1980-2003, released 2007. Social
expenditure are given as a percentage of each country’s GDP. We multiplied
by GDP from the OECD National Accounts to obtain the absolute amounts,
and then divided by the gross output of the health and social work sector,
available in KLEMS, to obtain the rates. The value of “benefits in kind” for
the following social expenditure categories were aggregated to arrive at the
social subsidy: old age (code 120), incapacity (code 320), and family (code
520). In all these categories the benefits in kind were for residential or day
care and home-help services. The common feature uniting these items was
that the employees delivering these “benefits in kind” worked in the health
and social work sector.
Our broader health and social subsidy adds half of total spending on
Health care, (code 420), also available in SOCX.
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Figure 2. The calculated tax wedge, 1994-2003 (social subsidies only)
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Figure 1. Percentage distribution of hours of work, 1994-2003, 
sorted according to sector 2 size
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Figure 3a Predicted impact of taxation, share of health and social 
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Figure 3b Predicted impact of taxation, share of health and 
social care sector, epsilon 1.5
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Figure 4. Required productivity ratio to match relative 
hours, deviations from log mean (mean=1)
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Figure 5a
Predicted sector 2 share, home production exogenous
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Predicted sector 3 share, home production exogenous
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Actual and predicted marketization in health and social work
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Figure 6b
Actual and predicted marketization in other services
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